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Abstract:  All animal species have adapted for survival and no species is superior overall. For 
cognitive capacities and sentience, invertebrates such as the octopus, although quite unlike 
vertebrates, can achieve similar performance levels. So can other invertebrates with small 
brains; hence they too, as sentient beings, deserve moral consideration from humans. How are 
we to identify these species? Only though a detailed analysis of their behavior. The decision, 
which is a moral judgment, depends on biological knowledge that still needs to be acquired. 
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1.  From Darwin to the Mind.  A linear (and misguided) conception of the evolution of living 
species sees vertebrates (a group that includes the human species) as the peak of biological 
complexity as well as intelligence (Chapman & Huffman, 2018). Vertebrates comprise a very 
homogenous group of species with highly developed brains; they have been shown to have 
outstanding cognitive skills, such as those of birds and mammals (Chapouthier, 2015). Most 
philosophers addressing practical moral issues in the relation between human and nonhuman 
animals restrict the scope of their analysis to vertebrates – sometimes just to the sub-group 
of mammals (Regan, 1983). Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) note in their target article 
that many still have a binary view, distinguishing vertebrates from all other beings in the 
animal kingdom, classified as invertebrates, even though invertebrates are a heterogenous 
group ranging from highly intelligent animals, such as the octopus (Mather 2019), to animals 
with no nervous system at all, such as the sponge (Leys et al., 2019) 
Darwin’s theories have shown that the world of living beings is not a linear structure; 
it ramifies to form branches and divisions. All species have developed their own means of 
survival and reproduction. No single species can be ranked as superior or inferior to the rest. 
As M&P note, cognitive skills emerge at irregular points in the evolutionary tree. Cephalopod 
molluscs, including the octopus, form a group that could be described as “modified snails.” 
They have been found to achieve the same performance levels as vertebrates even though 
there is no direct anatomical relationship of descent between them. The same is true of social 
insects, likewise capable of extremely complex and intelligent behavior despite the small size 
of their brains. M&P are making a well-founded and valid point when they state that “the 
nearly wholesale exclusion of invertebrates with central nervous systems from bioethics and 
science policy is not justified by the current state of the evidence.” After reading their 
excellent target article and the many references cited, it is impossible not to reach the same 
conclusion. 
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2.  Moral Considerations and Biology.  I would like to follow up a point made by M&P that 
needs to be treated in greater depth: “the same kinds of data and reasoning that justify moral 
protections for vertebrates favor extending similar protections to some invertebrates” [my 
italics]. How can we find and agree upon a concrete specification of the way certain 
invertebrates should be treated? And which ones? How can M&P’s theoretical argument be 
developed and put into practice, first in moral terms, and then in legal terms? 
As urged by Jeremy Bentham (1780/1970), the question that needs to be answered 
concerns how to determine which animals can suffer – or, more accurately, which animals 
have consciousness, or are conscious of suffering, i.e. which animals can be described as 
“sentient” according to M&P’s definition, along with the “affective glossing of conscious 
experience”? In the tree of Darwinian evolution, it becomes a matter of finding the groups 
where a form of sentience emerges. The challenge is made more difficult by the fact that, like 
most biological processes, sentience probably emerges in gradual stages and not through a 
sudden shift from absence to presence. What a fish feels is not the same as what a human 
being feels (Woodruff 2017; 2020): How can the even greater differences between what we 
and crustaceans or insects feel be studied so as to guide us in how they ought to be treated? 
I think the answer must be based on detailed ethological analysis of the behavior 
patterns of different invertebrates. There is not yet enough analytical work in this field. It is 
clear that, as stated in the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012), “the absence of a 
neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states.” 
Positive and negative affect is an integral feature of sentience for moral purposes. It is clear 
from ethological studies that a small brain does not rule out the potential for a form of 
sentience: The findings of Elwood, (2013, 2020) on decapod crustaceans and of Stach et al 
(2004) on social insects such as bees support this. A small brain, however, does not 
automatically mean complex behavior patterns, emotions or sentience either, as in the case 
of the earthworm or the oyster.  
Only detailed analysis of the behavior of invertebrates -- species by species, or even 
sub-species by sub-species or population by population -- can lead to answers on the moral 
stance to be adopted in practice. Here, as is often the case, the moral implications and the 
resultant legal provisions to implement concrete welfare measures to protect the rights of  
certain groups of invertebrates (Chapouthier and Nouet, 1998; Chapouthier, 2014) can only 
be established on the basis of more thorough scientific knowledge in the field of ethology. 
Biology is therefore an indispensable discipline in the work required to improve the practical 
application of moral judgments (Chapouthier, 2019). Moral philosophers and legal scholars 
endeavoring to make progress with such considerations are dependent on biologists for 
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